ACM35 Afghanistan 1979-1988 Soviet Air Power Against the Mujahideen (e).pdf

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C A M P A I G N
A I R
AFGHANISTAN
1979–88
MARK GALEOT TI
|
Soviet air power against the
mujahideen
I L LU S T R AT E D B Y E D O UA R D A . G R O U LT
A I R C A M PA I G N
AFGHANISTAN
1979–88
Soviet air power against the
mujahideen
MARK GALEOT TI |
ILLUSTR ATE D BY E DOUARD A. GR OU LT
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHRONOLOGY
ATTACKER’S CAPABILITIES
DEFENDER’S CAPABILITIES
CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES
THE CAMPAIGN
AFTERMATH AND ANALYSIS
FURTHER READING
GLOSSARY
INDEX
4
8
9
28
39
45
89
94
94
95
4
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
MiG-29 pilots heading
toward their aircraft to
prepare for a mission. The
MiG-29 was one of the
best counters the Soviets
had to Pakistani F-16s and
were therefore used as
bomber escorts. (Patrick
Aventurier/Gamma-Rapho
via Getty Images)
When Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, it was intended to be a
brief show of force to instal a new and more biddable leader of the People’s Democratic Party
of Afghanistan (PDPA) and overawe a rural rebellion.
1
After all, under Hafizullah Amin’s
dictatorial rule, the country was increasingly up in arms, galvanized by his revolutionary
government’s threat to their traditional social structures and Muslim faith. Within a few
months of the 1978 ‘Saur Revolution’ that had brought the PDPA to power, the first local
risings would take place, with the March 1979 Herat revolt being crushed only through a
massive air and ground attack that left thousands dead. Heavy-handed government reprisals
only spurred on the rebels, whose numbers were also swollen by desertions from Kabul’s
forces. Amin proved increasingly dictatorial – he had his co-ruler Nur Mohammad Taraki
arrested and then murdered – and refused to compromise.
Moscow tried and failed to persuade Amin to adopt a more moderate position, and
increasingly feared that he would either spark a fundamentalist Islamic revolution – as had
just happened in Iran – or turn to Washington for support. The Soviet invasion was thus
expected to be a brief, limited operation: Operation
Storm-333,
a commando mission to
eliminate Amin so he could be replaced by Babrak Karmal, who was regarded as both more
moderate and less wilful, and Operation
Baikal-79,
a short, sharp demonstration of Soviet
military power sufficient to stabilize the situation in the countryside.
2
Instead, it turned out
to be just the start of a decade-long fight that the Soviets did not technically lose, but which
it became clear they could not win, either.
This was a war fought as much in the air as on the ground. Indeed, arguably it was
Soviet air power that made the difference between a defeat for Moscow, and the debilitating
1
2
See
The Soviet–Afghan War 1979–89
(Osprey Essential Histories 75, 2012)
See
Storm-333: KGB and Spetsnaz Seize Kabul, Soviet–Afghan War 1979
(Osprey
RAID 54, 2021)
5
stalemate that reformist leader Mikhail Gorbachev eventually decided was no longer worth
fighting. From the high-level bombing raids that blasted rebel-held mountain valleys, to
the Mi-24 helicopter gunships and Su-25 jets that accompanied every substantial army
operation, Soviet control of the air was a vital battlefield asset. It was as crucial for every
aspect of its operations off the battlefield too, from the Mi-8 helicopters ferrying supplies to
remote mountain-top observation points to An-12 ‘black tulips’ taking the bodies of fallen
soldiers on their last journey home.
Yet even if the rebel
mujahideen
had no air forces, this was not a wholly one-sided
conflict. Even before they began to acquire man-portable surface-to-air missiles such as the
controversial US FIM-92 Stinger, they adapted aggressively and imaginatively. They learnt
new techniques of evasion, camouflage and deception, set up ambushes against low-level
attacks, and even launched daring raids on airbases to destroy aircraft on the ground.
Drawing on both Russian and Western sources, this book explores and assesses rebel,
Afghan government and Soviet operations, to paint a comprehensive picture of the air war
over Afghanistan. Although even massive aerial superiority could not win this fight for the
Soviets, nonetheless their experiences did revolutionize their understanding of air war, from
the use of helicopters – a lesson the United States had likewise truly learnt in Vietnam –
to the importance of giving pilots a degree of flexibility and freedom in their operations.
Afghanistan is, after all, an unforgiving combat environment, even for air forces. A Soviet
General Staff assessment warned that, ‘in terms of the nature of the terrain, Afghanistan
is one of the most unfavourable of areas for aviation operations’. Some 70 per cent of the
country is mountainous, with the mighty Hindu Kush range towering up to 7,000m in some
cases, bisected by gorges of up to 3,000m depths. There were only five airfields with long
enough runways for most modern combat aircraft – Kabul, Bagram, Jalalabad, Kandahar and
Shindand – and they were all at altitude: 1,500–2,500m above sea level. In the high, thin
air, helicopter rotors struggled to obtain sufficient lift, let alone negotiate what were often
A Mil Mi-24D patrols the
mountains near Kabul in
April 1989. This was a
Soviet gunship that was
then transferred to the
DRA during the
withdrawal. (Derrick
Ceyrac/AFP via
Getty Images)

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